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Zoning and Land Use Planning
Patricia E. Salkin*
Regulating Controversial Land Uses
Introduction
Recently, the American Planning Association sponsored a
national teleconference on regulating controversial land uses.
It caught my attention since we have been regulating all
types of unpopular uses since the dawn of zoning. While new
types of uses have become controversial recently, such as
payday lenders, backyard burials, and medical marijuana
dispensaries, other uses like tattoo parlors, adult businesses,
fraternity and sorority houses, and billboards remain just as
controversial today as they were decades ago. And while
lawyers and planners may have a more fully developed body
of case law and regulations to study with respect to the lat-
ter, case law is just now developing to help with a better
understanding of any constitutional and common law
implications for emerging controversial uses.
There are a number of criteria for what may make uses
“controversial.” For example, neighborhood residents may
believe that a particular use is incompatible with existing
uses because it is aesthetically unpleasing, or because of the
type of trac or clientele that it might generate. Further-
more, residential property owners may believe that certain
uses will decrease property values, and in commercial cor-
ridors, business owners may believe that certain uses will be
bad for existing businesses because they may keep patrons
away. Sometimes these are well founded concerns based on
evidence; other times these concerns may be perpetuated
based on stereotypes. No matter how undesirable some con-
troversial uses may be in a given community, the uses in
and of themselves are legal, and many often may be subject
to additional layers of local, state or federal regulation.
*Patricia E. Salkin is the Raymond & Ella Smith Distinguished
Professor of Law at Albany Law School where she is also Associate Dean
and Director of the Government Law Center. Salkin is the author of
American Law of Zoning, 5th ed. (Thomson Reuters) and New York Zoning
Law & Practice, 4th ed. (Thomson Reuters).
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General Techniques to Regulate Controversial Uses
Planners and municipal attorneys may employ a number
of trusted zoning and land use regulatory techniques to ef-
fectively regulate controversial land uses. These tools may
address some of the articulated concerns of adjacent and
nearby property owners and business operators. For example,
if a particular use is undesirable because it tends to gener-
ate a lot of noise—such as bars or businesses that use heavy
equipment—municipalities might regulate hours of opera-
tion for these uses. Buering is another tool that can be
used both to hide and screen the controversial use from other
uses in the area, and certain types of buering may be able
to help minimize noise, and possibly redirect trac patterns
to and from the use. However, when limiting hours of opera-
tion, ocials must be careful to do so in a manner that is not
arbitrary and capricious. For example, in a recent case a
New Jersey municipality sought to prevent a formula based
retail store (a 7-Eleven) from operating 24 hours.1 The trial
court found that the public justication asserted by the
Borough, to protect the “peace and repose” of the nearby res-
idential neighborhoods, was not supported by any evidence
because in enacting the Ordinance there was no reference to
any studies, or statistical data that would support the posi-
tion and the Borough was unable to identify any incident
which illustrated the disturbance that the 24 hour operation
of a convenience store would cause.2 The Court pointed out
that the Borough failed to address the question why the 24
hour operation of another formula based retail shop (a
Dunkin Donuts) at the same location as the 7-Eleven would
not equally disturb the “peace and repose” of the surround-
ing neighborhood.3
Where a particular use is especially out of character with
1
NOH, Inc. and 7-Eleven, Inc. v. Borough of Rutherford Council and
Mary B. Kriston, No. BER-L-5173-07 (N.J. Super. Ct. 11/10/2009).
2
NOH, Inc. and 7-Eleven, Inc. v. Borough of Rutherford Council and
Mary B. Kriston, No. BER-L-5173-07 (N.J. Super. Ct. 11/10/2009).
3
NOH, Inc. and 7-Eleven, Inc. v. Borough of Rutherford Council and
Mary B. Kriston, No. BER-L-5173-07 (N.J. Super. Ct. 11/10/2009) (The
Court held that the Ordinance being predicated on unsupported ndings
established that its enactment was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.
The Court noted that the Borough's failure to regulate all businesses in
the same manner was discriminatory. The Court went on to reason that
the already existent regulatory means that address noise, littering, loiter-
ing and lights are sucient and are less intrusive upon Plainti's prop-
erty rights than the Ordinance. Therefore, since the Ordinance was not
reasonably related to a public need, unreasonably discriminated against a
Zoning and Land Use Planning
527© 2011 Thomson Reuters E Real Estate Law Journal E Vol. 39 Spring 2011
the neighborhood, municipalities may decide to amend the
zoning and eliminate the use outright in certain districts.
When this happens, communities may still nd that where
such uses already existed prior to the new ban, the uses may
acquire legally pre-existing non-conforming use status.
Remember, though, the general rule is that municipalities
are able to legally extinguish these nonconforming uses
through amortization so long as the owner has been able to
realize a reasonable return on investment.4
The special use permit may be another eective tool to
regulate controversial land uses.5 While the zoning may not
prohibit certain uses outright, especially in situations where
case law has mandated that particular uses be allowed
somewhere in the municipality (e.g., mobile homes and adult
uses), local governments may choose to allow them in select
zoning districts subject to additional layers of review that
can be applied through the special use permit process. This
will enable more careful consideration of how the particular
use as proposed will impact the community.
Municipalities also may grant permits for certain uses
subject to reasonable conditions. However, when imposing
conditions, planners and lawyers must be mindful to ensure
that there is sucient evidence in the record to support
them. For example, a recent appeals court in New York
determined that a number of conditions imposed on the ap-
proval of a site plan application for the remodeling of a big
box store were arbitrary and hence impermissible.6 Speci-
cally, the court found that the Town Board's attempt to re-
strict the hours during which Home Depot could operate its
business and clean the parking area was arbitrary and capri-
cious since the Town oered no ndings or rationale to sup-
particular business, and was not the least restrictive means to address
the public need, the Court declared the Ordinance to be an invalid exercise
of the Borough's police power.).
4
See generally, Salkin, Abandonment, Discontinuance and Amortiza-
tion of Nonconforming Uses: Lessons for Drafters of Zoning Regulations,
38 Real Est. L.J. 482 (Spring 2010); Campbell, Amortization in the
Twenty-First Century, 26 No. 11 ZPLR 1 (2004); and Salkin, Anderson's
American Law of Zoning 5th §§ 12:1 et seq.
5
See, e.g., Salkin, Anderson's American Law of Zoning 5th §§ 14:1 et
seq.
6
Home Depot, U.S.A. v. Town Bd. of Town of Hempstead, 63 A.D.3d
938, 881 N.Y.S.2d 160 (2d Dep't 2009).
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port the imposition of such restrictions.7 The Court acknowl-
edged that although time restrictions could be used to
eectively reduce trac and noise during certain hours, the
Town made no specic ndings as applied to this application.8
Further, the Court also found arbitrary the Board's condi-
tion requiring the installation of a closed circuit television
recording system since no ndings were made to support the
conclusion that this system would aect the “safety and gen-
eral welfare of the adjacent areas.”9
Backyard Burials
There have been a number of cases lately dealing with in-
dividual property owners' desires to bury loved ones in their
backyards. In fact, the New York Times reported last year
that amid the recession, people have been looking to cut
back on funerals and the number of at-home burials has
increased dramatically over the last ve years. The paper
reported that in 2002 there were two companies that special-
ized in aiding families to bury their loved ones at home, and
as of last year there were at least 45 companies.10
In a recent case from Connecticut, it seems as though a
couple made a pact that they would be buried next to each
other when they died. Since there were no burial plots in the
Town when the husband died, his wife buried him in their
backyard.11 Eight months later, the zoning compliance ocer
issued a cease and desist order on the grounds that a private
burial was not a permitted use under the zoning
regulations.12 The wife sought a declaratory judgment that
she had a right to use her private property to bury her late
husband on her property and that upon her death she could
7
Home Depot, U.S.A. v. Town Bd. of Town of Hempstead, 63 A.D.3d
938, 881 N.Y.S.2d 160 (2d Dep't 2009).
8
Home Depot, U.S.A. v. Town Bd. of Town of Hempstead, 63 A.D.3d
938, 881 N.Y.S.2d 160 (2d Dep't 2009).
9
Home Depot, U.S.A. v. Town Bd. of Town of Hempstead, 63 A.D.3d
938, 881 N.Y.S.2d 160 (2d Dep't 2009).
10
Zezima, “Home Burials Oer and Intimate Alternative,” N.Y. Times
7/20/2009, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/21/us/21funeral.h
tml.
11
Piquet v. Town of Chester, 2008 WL 4635473 (Conn. Super. Ct.
2008), judgment rev'd, 124 Conn. App. 518, 5 A.3d 947 (2010), certication
granted in part, 299 Conn. 917 (2010).
12
Piquet v. Town of Chester, 2008 WL 4635473 (Conn. Super. Ct.
2008), judgment rev'd, 124 Conn. App. 518, 5 A.3d 947 (2010), certication
granted in part, 299 Conn. 917 (2010).
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be buried there too, and she further argued that the burial
of her husband constitutes an accessory use of her lot.13 Upon
review of the zoning regulations, the Court concluded that
cemeteries are allowed subject to special use permit but that
the permits may only be issued to a church or a cemetery
association.14 Furthermore, since the Town's zoning scheme
is permissive (uses not specically permitted are prohibited),
the Plainti needed to show some language in the regula-
tions that permitted the burial. With no express language,
the wife argued that the burial was an accessory use, but
the Court found insucient evidence to support this argu-
ment, and concluded that the section of the zoning regula-
tions that deals with cemeteries prevailed over more general
language regarding accessory uses.15
In 2009, a Baptist minister in Uniontown, Pennsylvania,
buried his 18-year-old son, who died three days after a car
crash, in the backyard of the pastor's church. While state
law doesn't prohibit this, some county and local ordinances
do, and this county, Fayette County, only allows burials on
large parcels zoned for agricultural use. The church has only
ve acres and is in a residential zone. Fines for violations
rack up quickly at $500 per day. Just last month, the pastor
agreed to settle with the town after his request for a vari-
ance was denied by the zoning board of appeals. He agreed
to move the grave from church grounds and according to the
settlement, the church will withdraw its appeal of the zon-
ing board's decision and the county will not pursue any nes,
court costs or other penalties related to the case.16
13
Piquet v. Town of Chester, 2008 WL 4635473 (Conn. Super. Ct.
2008), judgment rev'd, 124 Conn. App. 518, 5 A.3d 947 (2010), certication
granted in part, 299 Conn. 917 (2010).
14
Piquet v. Town of Chester, 2008 WL 4635473 (Conn. Super. Ct.
2008), judgment rev'd, 124 Conn. App. 518, 5 A.3d 947 (2010), certication
granted in part, 299 Conn. 917 (2010).
15
Piquet v. Town of Chester, 2008 WL 4635473 (Conn. Super. Ct.
2008), judgment rev'd, 124 Conn. App. 518, 5 A.3d 947 (2010), certication
granted in part, 299 Conn. 917 (2010).
16
Jennifer Harr, “Pastor to Move Son to a New Grave,” Herald
Standard, 10/20/2010. Available at: http://www.heraldstandard.com/new
sdetail/article/1631/2010/october/20/pastor-to-move-son-to-new-grave.h
tml.
Real Estate Law Journal [Vol. 39:4 2011]
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Regulating O-Campus Fraternity and Sorority
Housing17
By 1990, nearly 700,000 students at hundreds of colleges
and universities belonged to fraternities or sororities, and
enrollment has continued to increase.18 While in some cases
members live together on-campus, it is more common for
fraternities and sororities to own or operate o-campus hous-
ing for their members. As fraternity and sorority houses
have proliferated, so have their impacts on the communities
where they are located. As the Supreme Court has noted,
“The regimes of boarding houses, fraternity houses, and the
like present urban problems. More people occupy a given
space; more cars rather continuously pass by; more cars are
parked; noise travels with crowds.”19 The Town of Gorham,
Maine recently banned fraternity and sorority houses and
adopted a set of regulations requiring the two existing houses
to pay an annual license fee and undergo semi-annual safety
code inspections.20 In Salt Lake City, Utah, the city is cur-
rently at odds with a fraternity house occupying a former
Episcopal Church over the need for it to obtain a new use
permit.21 Problems can also arise if a fraternity becomes
suspended and no longer qualies as a permitted use under
zoning that allows fraternities. At the University of Pitts-
burgh, for example, a fraternity was subject to a drug raid
and became a “nonrecognized student organization.” As a
result, its occupancy permit was revoked by the city, which
meant that it could no longer use its building unless the city
issued a new permit. The matter was resolved when the
University decided to recognize the fraternity again on a
17
This section is based on Salkin and Lavine, Zoning for O-Campus
Fraternity and Sorority Houses, Zoning & Plan. L. Rep. (December 2010).
18
Craig L. Torbenson, From the Beginning: A History of College
Fraternities and Sororities, in Brothers and Sisters: Diversity in College
Fraternities and Sororities 37–38 (Craig L. Torbenson and Gregory S.
Parks, eds.) (2009).
19
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 94 S. Ct. 1536, 39 L.
Ed. 2d 797, 6 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1417, 4 Envtl. L. Rep. 20302 (1974).
20
Meleanie Creamer, “Gorham Prohibits New Frats, Allows Existing
Ones to Stay,” Portland Press Herald, 10/6/2010. See, http://www.pressher
ald.com/news/gorham-prohibits-new-frats-allows-current-ones-to-stay
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probational basis.22 Similar zoning issues have arisen in
many other cities across the country.23
Zoning for fraternities and sororities can present unique
challenges, however. Aside from determining the type and
severity of regulations that should be applied, fraternity and
sorority houses do not easily t within traditional zoning
categories. Many denitions of “family” prevent unrelated
groups of people from living in single-family zoning districts,
and dierent designations may need to be created for student
housing.24
Zoning restrictions placed on fraternities and sororities
are reviewed under a rational basis standard, and will gen-
erally be upheld so long as they are reasonable. Chico Corp.
v. Delaware-Muncie Board of Zoning, for example, involved
certain lot area and setback requirements imposed on
fraternities located in the “Student Social Service Zoning
District.” The zoning board denied a permit for a fraternity
on a lot that was smaller than required under the ordinance,
and the fraternity claimed that the regulations were
“arbitrary and capricious.” The court disagreed, explaining
that the lot size and setback restrictions were reasonably re-
22
Jon Schmitz, Pitt to Reinstate Fraternity; Zoning Reprieve Possible,









Fraternity House Needs Permit, Times Union, Feb. 19, 2002, at B8, avail-
able at http://albarchive.merlinone.net/mweb/wmsql.wm.request?oneimag
e&imageid=6159195; Sijai Cai, Brothers (and Friends) Weigh Housing
Choices, The Yale Herald Online, available at http://yaleherald.com/new
s/brothers-and-friends-weigh-housing-choices-2/ (Oct. 27, 2009) (the
fraternity Sigma Alpha Epsilon was ned because its members had been
living in the building for 13 years without submitting the required
documentation for a special use permit); Kelly House & Nico Rubello,
Zoning Problems Leave MSU Fraternity Homeless, The State News (Aug.
6, 2008).
24
See, e.g., City of Syracuse v. Snow, 123 Misc. 568, 205 N.Y.S. 785
(Sup 1924). See also Adam Lubow, Not Related by Blood, Marriage, or
Adoption: A History of the Denition of “Family” in Zoning Law, 16 J.
Affordable Housing & Community Dev. L. 144, FN 329 (2007).
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lated to the municipality's interest in buering the neighbor-
hood from noise, trac, and congestion problems.25
To deal with the encroachment of student housing into
residential neighborhoods, some local governments have
enacted student housing ordinances. In some cases, fraterni-
ties and sororities are limited to certain zoning districts.26
Many ordinances deal with smaller groups of students,
however. In Smith v. Lower Marion Township, for example,
the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
upheld an ordinance that limited “student homes” to no more
than three students and subjected them to strict district and
special permit requirements. Fraternities and sororities were
classied separately, and were permitted only by special
exception.27 In upholding these restrictions, the court
explained that the ordinance was aimed at maintaining the
township's residential character, limiting noise and conges-
tion, and maintaining property values.28 A similar ordinance
was upheld against an equal protection challenge in Farley
v. Zoning Hearing Board. The court determined that it was
reasonable for the board to impose dierent standards on
student homes given testimony from various people demon-
strating that existing student homes created a “dormitory-
like” atmosphere with excessive noise, frequent parties, cars
parked on sidewalks, congestion, trash, and public
urination.29
Many zoning ordinances subject fraternities and sororities
to special permit requirements, and under this type of re-
striction municipalities retain a great deal of discretion to
grant or deny approval. In Grand Chapter of Phi Sigma
Kappa v. Grosberg, for example, the petitioner owned a
fraternity house in the City of Troy, New York, and sought
approval to use an adjoining lot as a dormitory and study
25
See Chico Corp. v. Delaware-Muncie Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 466
N.E.2d 472 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).
26
See, e.g., City of Long Beach v. California Lambda Chapter of Sigma
Alpha Epsilon Fraternity, 255 Cal. App. 2d 789, 63 Cal. Rptr. 419, 25
A.L.R.3d 912 (2d Dist. 1967) (fraternities permitted in commercial districts
and multiple dwelling districts by special permit).
27
Smith v. Lower Merion Tp., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11100, *3 (Aug.
6, 1991).
28
Smith v. Lower Merion Tp., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11100, *3 (Aug.
6, 1991); Smith v. Lower Merion Tp., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7177 (May
11, 1992).
29
Farley v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Lower Merion Tp., 161 Pa. Commw.
229, 636 A.2d 1232 (1994).
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hall. The zoning board denied the application, stating that
the additional fraternity use would lower property values in
the neighborhood and noting that the poor maintenance of
the rst building did not indicate that any improvement
would be made by permitting the dormitory and study hall.
The court found this explanation to be reasonable and up-
held the denial of the special use permit.30
However, to deny a permit application for a fraternity or
sorority, a municipality must rely on more evidence than
neighborhood opposition. In Tempo Holding Co. v. Oxford
City Council, the company led an application for an ad-
ditional use permit for fraternity and sorority housing in an
Urban Business Commercial District. Despite testimony
from the city's planning director and a retired building and
zoning administrator that the use would be compatible with
the surrounding area, the city council denied the permit
request based on negative comments made by nearby prop-
erty owners. The court held that this decision was arbitrary
and capricious, as the evidence showed that the area
contained a number of residential uses, including multiple-
resident student housing complexes, and the comments made
in opposition to the application were conclusory and
speculative.31 In a similar case, Franklin and Marshall
College v. Zoning Hearing Board of City of Lancaster, the
city's zoning board rejected a permit to convert a single-
family home in a Conversion Apartment district into a
fraternity based on community opposition rather than the
objective requirements of the ordinance. The court held that
there was no substantial evidence that the fraternity would
be incompatible with the surrounding area because the
neighbors did not show how the impact would be any
“greater than that normally to be expected from such uses.”32
Tattoo Parlors
Tattoo parlors and body piercing establishments have
recently garnered more attention as controversial land uses.
A common concern expressed by municipalities when draft-
ing zoning ordinances that preclude or limit tattoo parlors is
the health and safety of the community, and the belief that
30
Grand Chapter of Phi Sigma Kappa v. Grosberg, 30 A.D.2d 887,
291 N.Y.S.2d 606 (3d Dep't 1968).
31
Tempo Holding Co. v. Oxford City Council, 78 Ohio App. 3d 1, 603
N.E.2d 414, 415 (12th Dist. Butler County 1992).
32
Franklin and Marshall College v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of City of
Lancaster, 29 Pa. Commw. 478, 371 A.2d 557, 559 (1977).
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the area may be blighted by the presence of such
establishments. However, practitioners must be mindful of
conicting case law discussing whether tattooing is expres-
sive conduct, which could aord First Amendment protection
to the use.
In Hold Fast Tattoo, LLC v. City of North Chicago,33 a
federal district court upheld the city council's denial of a
special use permit for the operation of a tattoo studio where
the Council informed the plainti that it was “not the kind
of business” the council wanted in the neighborhood. Follow-
ing the denial, the plainti alleged that his constitutional
rights were violated, asserting that the denial violated his
right to equal protection, substantive due process and
procedural due process, and that the zoning ordinance is an
unconstitutional exercise of the state's police power on its
face and as applied to the plainti. While the plainti argued
that his right to free speech under the First Amendment
was violated, asserting that the right to draw tattoos is
protected speech, the Court said that the act of tattooing is
not constitutionally-protected free speech because the act
itself is not intended to convey a particularized message.
Finding no fundamental right or suspect class, the Court
held that the government's decision to deny the permit could
be rationally related to a legitimate state interest, as the
City explained numerous planning goals are advanced by
the requirement of a special use permit for this use including:
“character, stability, or intended development of the City's
central business district; suitability of the location to the
proposed use; necessity and desirability of a proposed use in
a particular location; and protection of the health and/or
safety of the community.” After nding that the plainti is
not entitled to relief for an Equal Protection violation, nor
for due process violations, and further nding that since the
zoning ordinance itself is rationally related to a legitimate
state interest, and plainti has neglected to include in the
complaint any grounds upon which the zoning ordinance
could be unrelated to a legitimate state interest, the police
powers challenge to the zoning ordinance also failed.
In a second case, decided by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in September 2010,34 the Court's position was dier-
ent on the First Amendment issue. In the case, Anderson
33
Hold Fast Tattoo, LLC v. City of North Chicago, 580 F. Supp. 2d
656 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
34
Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2010).
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sought to establish a tattoo parlor in the City of Hermosa
Beach, but the City Code eectively banned tattoo parlors by
not including them in the zoning of permitted businesses.
Tattooing, according to the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, and the Food and Drug Administration, could
have adverse health implications (the transmission of
hepatitis, syphilis, tuberculosis, leprosy, and HIV), and
because of this, the State of California imposed certain
requirements on tattooing businesses. After Anderson's
request for the City's permission to open a tattoo business
was denied, he brought a Section 1983 suit alleging that the
ban was facially unconstitutional under the First and 14th
Amendments. The Ninth Circuit began by deciding that tat-
tooing was purely expressive activity, more akin to writing,
than just conduct potentially expressive of an idea, and as
such, it was entitled to full First Amendment protection. The
Court found that tattooing was a process like writing words
or drawing a picture, except that it was done on a person's
skin, and, as with writing or painting, the tattooing process
was inextricably intertwined with the purely expressive
product. The fact that the City's ban related to tattooing
businesses rather than the tattooing process itself did not af-
fect whether the activity regulated was protected by the
First Amendment: the sale or business of tattooing was
entitled to full constitutional protection, and the City's
regulation would be constitutional only if it was a reason-
able “time, place, or manner” restriction on protected speech.
Anderson did not dispute that the City had a signicant
interest in regulating tattooing because of the health and
safety concerns; rather, he argued that the regulation was
substantially broader than needed because the interests
could be met through sanitary and sterilization
requirements. The court agreed. Further, the ban “completely
foreclosed” a venerable and unique means of communication
and accordingly, the ban failed the time, place or manner
analysis. Perhaps another distinction between this case and
Hold Fast Tattoo, is the fact that in the previous case the
use was subject to special permit review, as compared to the
total ban in Anderson.
Medical Marijuana
Fourteen states and the District of Columbia currently
permit the medical use of marijuana for qualied patients
(Alaska, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Michigan,
Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, Nevada, Oregon, Rhode
Real Estate Law Journal [Vol. 39:4 2011]
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Island, Vermont and Washington),35 yet the land use implica-
tions for the cultivation, distribution and use of the drug are
just beginning to be dealt with through zoning ordinances.36
Exploring nuisance theories, the San Jose, California Dep-
uty City Attorney opined that the City code does not allow
for a land use that is a nuisance, and that which is illegal
under state or federal law, constitutes a nuisance.37 Since
the cultivation, sale, and use of marijuana is illegal under
federal law, he asserted that medical marijuana dispensing
facilities would constitute a nuisance.38 One California court
recently held that failure to comply with the City's procedural
requirements related to medical marijuana dispensaries cre-
35
Uses of Marijuana for Persons Suering from Debilitating Medical
Conditions Act, Alaska Stat. §§ 17-37-010 to 17-37-080; Compassionate
Use Act of 1996, Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11362.5; Colo. Const. Art.
XVIII, § 14; Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 329-121 to 329-128; Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 22, §§ 2421 to 2429; Michigan Medical Marijuana Act, Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 333.26421 to 333.26430; Montana, Medicinal
Marijuana Act, Mont. Code Ann. §§ 50-46-101 to 50-46-210; Nevada, Nev.
Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 453A.101 to 435A.810; New Jersey Compassionate Use
Medicinal Marijuana Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. 24:6I-1 to 24:6I-16; Lynn and
Erin Compassionate Use Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 26-2B-1 to 26-2B-7; Oregon
Medical Marijuana Act, Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 475.300 to 475.346; The Edward
O. Hawkins and Thomas C. Slater Medical Marijuana Act, R.I. Gen. Laws
§§ 21-28.6-1 to 21-28.6-12; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, §§ 4472 to 4474d;
Washington State Medical Use of Marijuana Act, Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§§ 69.51A.005 to 69.51A.902.
36
See generally, Salkin and Kansler, Medical Marijuana Meets
Zoning: Can You Grow, Sell and Smoke that Here? 62 Plan. & Envtl. L. 3
(August 2010).
37
Doyle, City Attorney, Workload Assessment-Medical Marijuana








Doyle, City Attorney, Workload Assessment-Medical Marijuana
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ated a nuisance per se and the imposition of a preliminary
injunction was within the court's discretion.39
A number of municipalities have chosen to regulate the
cultivation and sale of medical marijuana by imposing
distance restrictions similar to those used in regulating adult
businesses and those attempted to impose restrictions on
where convicted sex oenders can reside and work.40 Some
municipalities require a one thousand foot distance between
the property lines of a medical marijuana dispensing facility
and any residential zone districts.41 Other municipalities
require a distance of ve hundred feet.42 Some municipalities
allow less of a distance between the property lines of a
dispensing facility and residential district, such as Arcata,
California, where a dispensing facility may operate 300 feet
from a residential zone district,43 and Santa Cruz, Califor-
nia, where a dispensing facility may be within fty feet of a
residential unit if it can be proven that it will not have an
adverse aect on the residential unit.44 The City of Los An-
geles is somewhat more lenient, allowing dispensing facili-
ties to come into close contact with residential uses, but
requiring that the dispensing facility not abut, be across the
street or alley from, or share a corner with a lot zoned for
residential use or improved with a residential use.45 San
Mateo County's regulation contains no distance requirement,
but allows for the subjective assessment that there must be
a sucient distance between the dispensing facility and res-
39
City of Corona v. Naulls, 166 Cal. App. 4th 418, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1
(4th Dist. 2008).
40
See, Salkin and Merriam, Residency Restrictions for Convicted Sex
Oenders: A Popular Approach on Questionable Footing, 9 N.Y. Zoning &
Plan. L. Rep. 4 (Jan/Feb 2009).
41
See, e.g., Oakland, Cal., Code of Ordinances § 5-80-020; Commerce
City, Colo., Land Development Code § 21-5249(1)(b) to (d), available at htt
p://www.c3gov.com/DocumentView.aspx?DID=495; Monument, Colo., Code





See, e.g., Fort Bragg, Cal., Municipal Code § 9-30.040(B)(12)(b).
43
Arcata, Cal., Municipal Code § 9-42-105(E)(1)(b), available at http://
www.codepublishing.com/ca/arcata/.
44
Santa Cruz, Cal., Municipal Code§ 24-12-1300(2)(B), available at ht
tp://www.codepublishing.com/ca/santacruz/.
45
City of Los Angeles, Cal., Municipal Code § 45.19.6.2(A)(2)(b), avail-
able at http://www.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll?f=templates&fn=default.h
tm&vid=amlegal:lamcca.
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idential zone districts so as not to adversely aect the resi-
dential use.46
Another method used for keeping medical marijuana
dispensing facilities out of residential districts is to prohibit
the dispensing of medical marijuana as a home occupation.47
Furthermore, some municipalities disallow the cultivation
and sale of medical marijuana as an accessory use to an-
other home occupation.48 In an attempt to ensure that
personal residential cultivation conducted by a qualied
patient does not convert to a large-scale cultivation and
dispensing operation, qualied patients are compelled in
some jurisdictions to retain the functional aspects or
structures of a residential dwelling, such as bathrooms,
bedrooms, a kitchen and a living room.49 In Grand Rapids,
Michigan, an ordinance requires medicinal marijuana
caregivers (those that grow or provide medical marijuana to
patients) to register this use with the city as a home
occupation. The ordinance also requires that the primary
caregiver obtain a business license.50
46




See, e.g., Santa Cruz, Cal., Municipal Code § 24-22-539; Durango,
Colo., Code of Ordinances § 13-110(a); Freemont County, Colo., Bd. County
Comm'rs Temp. Reg. 5.2.1 to 5.2.3; Louisville, Colo., Code § 17.16.040.H;
Arcata, Cal., Municipal Code § 9-42-105(D)(1)(c); San Jose, Cal., Code
§ 20.08.1230.
48
See, e.g., Arcata, Cal., Municipal Code § 9-42-105(D)(1)(c), available
at http://www.codepublishing.com/ca/arcata/; Santa Cruz, Cal., Municipal
Code § 24.22.539 (2010). See http://www.codepublishing.com/CA/SantaCr
uz/.
49
See, e.g., Arcata, Cal., Municipal Code § 9-42-105(D)(1)(g), available
at http://www.codepublishing.com/ca/arcata; Fort Bragg, Cal., Municipal




Kyla King, Grand Rapids Requires Medical Marijuana Caregivers
to Register with City, The Grand Rapids Press, Mar. 9, 2010, available at
http://www.mlive.com/news/grand-rapids/index.ssf/2010/03/grandrapid
srequiresmedical.html.
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Other strategies have included limitations on the number
of dispensaries and various licensing and permitting
schemes.51
Pawn Shops
Even as early at 1904, there have been issues surrounding
the regulation of pawn shops. In Butte v. Paltrovich,52 a pawn
shop owner was convicted for violating an ordinance which
regulated the hours a pawn shop, loan oce or second-hand
store could operate. Appellant alleged that the ordinance
denied him equal protection of the law and unlawfully
interfered with the operation of his business. The court
dismissed the claim that the ordinance prohibited the opera-
tion of his business noting a distinction between prohibition
and regulation. And in response to the equal protection chal-
lenge, the court noted that the appellant failed to allege that
any other pawnbrokers were exempt from the ordinance.
The court concluded that the City had the authority to enact
such an ordinance and that the ordinance was a reasonable
use of the City's police powers.
In August 2010, a city ordinance regulating pawn shops
was upheld in Pawn America Minnesota, LLC v. City of St.
Louis Park.53 A pawn shop operator applied for a license to
operate a shop and the City denied the application. At the
time the pawn shop operator applied for a license, the City
zoning code permitted two pawnbroker licenses in the City,
one of which had previously been issued. Based on conversa-
tions with several city representatives, the pawn shop opera-
tor was under the assumption the license would be granted
so long as it could provide a valid certicate of occupancy.
The shop operator submitted the certicate of occupancy as
well as a land use registration application but the City would
not issue the license because of a pending moratorium on
new pawnshops. The pawn shop operator sought a writ of
mandamus to compel the City to issue the license but
instead, the court issued a writ of mandamus requiring the
51
See generally, Salkin and Kansler, Medical Marijuana Meets
Zoning: Can You Grow, Sell and Smoke that Here? 62 Plan. & Envtl. L. 3
(August 2010).
52
Butte v. Paltrovich, 30 Mont. 18, 1904 Mont. Lexis 44 (1904). See
also, Cash Inn of Dade, Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 938 F.2d 1239,
20 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 906 (11th Cir. 1991), for another example of an
ordinance which limited the hours of operation being upheld.
53
Pawn America Minnesota, LLC v. City of St. Louis Park, 787
N.W.2d 565 (Minn. 2010).
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City to appear before the court or, in the alternative, to issue
the license. The court denied the pawn shop operator's
request for a writ of mandamus. The City adopted an interim
ordinance and later adopted a permanent ordinance ef-
fectively prohibiting new or pending applications for pawn-
broker licenses. The pawn shop operator argued that the
interim ordinance was adopted for improper purposes, and
the district court found in favor of the City. The pawn shop
operator appealed to the court of appeals, which armed.
The pawn shop operator appealed, alleging the ordinance
was adopted to prevent it from obtaining a license. The stan-
dard of review for an interim ordinance was a case of rst
impression for the Minnesota court, which ultimately said
that if a municipality enacts a moratorium in good faith and
for a limited period of time, it is valid so long as appropriate
zoning ordinances are enacted promptly. The Court also
stated that the City's actions were not arbitrary or unrea-
sonable because the City was concerned with legitimate is-
sues surrounding pawn shops, including proper locations
and the impacts on land use. Here, the Court found that the
district court did not err and that the pawn shop operator
was properly denied a license.
Conclusion
This column just begins to scratch the surface on contro-
versial land uses. There are undoubtedly dozens of uses that
could be added to the discussion. However, the lessons
gleaned from these uses lead to some common themes that
are instructive for all controversial land uses. First,
municipalities can regulate these uses through their zoning
and police powers, within the connes of federal and state
constitutions and so long as the regulations and conditions
imposed are reasonable and not arbitrary. Second, when
designing appropriate land use regulations to deal with con-
troversial uses, it is a good idea to encourage public
participation for the purposes of ascertaining the crux of
community opposition and determining whether these
concerns can be addressed through the imposition of ap-
propriate conditions and limitations on permits. Third, al-
though not discussed in this column, practitioners must be
mindful of social justice considerations when deciding where
to locate controversial land uses to ensure that they are not
disproportionately placed in traditionally underrepresented
communities where there tend to be more residents who are
low-income and minority.
Zoning and Land Use Planning
541© 2011 Thomson Reuters E Real Estate Law Journal E Vol. 39 Spring 2011
